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THE DEVASTATING IMPACT OF PRIOR
CRIMES EVIDENCE AND OTHER MYTHS
OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS
LARRY LAUDAN ∗ & RONALD J. ALLEN ∗∗
We concur in the general opinion of courts, textwriters and the profession that much
of this law [concerning exclusion of evidence of prior crimes] is archaic, paradoxical
and full of compromises and compensations by which an irrational advantage to one
side is offset by a poorly reasoned counterprivilege to the other. . . . [Nonetheless]
[t]o pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more likely simply to
upset its present balance between adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice.
—Justice Robert H. Jackson for the United States Supreme Court

1

This Article argues that there is very good reason to believe that the
misshapen stone should indeed be extracted and that the result would be a
considerably less grotesque structure. There is abundant empirical
evidence that prior criminal convictions weigh heavily in jurors’ decisions
about acquittal and conviction. That same empirical work suggests that
jurors’ learning directly through the evidence that defendant has been
convicted of prior crimes makes very little difference to conviction rates.
This seeming paradox is examined in considerable detail. Understanding
how and why it arises suggests that the tendency in American law to
suppress information about prior crimes (except under special
circumstances) is a self-defeating strategy that not only lacks a convincing
epistemic foundation but may also be responsible for the inadvertent
conviction of innocent defendants. Arguably, it is often not the admission of
prior crimes evidence that is unfairly prejudicial so much as its exclusion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. ANALYSIS AND BACKGROUND

In the majority of legal systems in the developed world, triers-of-fact
are routinely made aware of the prior convictions of the accused. In the
United States, the admission of evidence of prior crimes is much more
difficult, facing a multitude of hurdles. According to Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE) Rule 404, prior crimes categorically cannot be used to
show character in order to prove “action in conformity therewith” or to
show a propensity to illegal acts (unless defendant triggers a discussion of
character), and they must also pass the Rule 403 balancing test, which rules
out such evidence if the judge concludes that it is substantially more
unfairly prejudicial than probatory. If a defendant takes the stand, prior
convictions can be used as evidence that he is a liar under Rule 609—
subject to the exceptions spelled out in Rule 404(b)—but generally not as
evidence that he committed the crime with which he is charged.2
The exclusion of prior crimes is not an occasional quirk of the
American legal system. It is the rule rather than the exception. In nine out
of ten jury trials of defendants with prior convictions in which the
defendant does not testify, the jury never learns about the prior convictions
through evidence.3 Even in trials where the defendant takes the stand, the
jury learns of his priors only about half the time. Since more than half of
defendants who go to trial have prior convictions, we are talking about
massive exclusions of prima facie relevant evidence.
Certain aspects of American evidence law—and considerable
American evidence scholarship—are founded on a widely-shared set of
beliefs concerning the admission of prior crimes of the defendant. Most of
these beliefs are predicated on hypotheses about the perverse inferential
psychology of jurors when it comes to evaluating prior crimes information.
Others are founded, not on presumed juror psychology, but on dubious
epistemic hypotheses about the probatory strength of prior crimes evidence.
Moreover, there is substantial handwringing about the difficult choice
defendants face about taking the stand in their own defense: if a defendant
takes the stand, he risks being destroyed by his prior convictions; if he does

2

Rules 413–415 also create more particular exceptions to the exclusion of prior crimes.
FED. R. EVID. 413–415.
3
See infra text accompanying note 47. It is important to stress that the focus in this
Article is entirely on prior convictions. Accordingly, little will be said here about whether
prior arrests and prior acquittals or alleged bad acts that never led to convictions should be
admitted. Interesting as such questions are, the data utilized here do not illuminate them.
For more on this issue, see infra notes 56 and 80.
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not take the stand, he is destroyed by his silence in the face of plausible
accusations. 4
Consider a few of these hypotheses:
H 1 : Telling jurors about the prior crimes of a defendant dramatically
increases their disposition to convict him and thereby puts at unnecessary
risk many innocent defendants with criminal records.5
H 2 : Information about prior crimes is, in most cases, only marginally
relevant to rational decisions about defendant’s guilt in the instant case.6
H 3 : Hence, in the Rule 403 balancing test between probative value and
unfair prejudice, prior crimes evidence should generally be excluded as
being substantially more unfairly prejudicial than probative.
H 4 : Whenever prior crimes evidence is introduced for a specific
purportedly non-propensity purpose allowed under Rule 404(b) (e.g.,
motive, opportunity, intent, and so on), and accompanied by a limiting
4

As it turns out, this is not a dilemma for the defendant with priors but it is for the
defendant without priors, as the failure to testify is highly associated with guilty verdicts.
This provides empirical support for the relative plausibility theory of juridical proof, as we
discuss infra note 71. On the relative plausibility theory, see Ronald J. Allen, Factual
Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 604, 609 (1994).
5
The eminent legal scholar John Henry Wigmore once claimed: “The natural and
inevitable tendency of the tribunal—whether judge or jury—is to give excessive weight to
the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the
present charge, or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of
the present charge.” JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 194 (3d ed. 1940). Along the
same lines, the U.S. Supreme Court in Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76
(1948), commented:
The state may not show defendant’s prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name
among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by
propensity a logical perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character is
irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade
them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend
against a particular charge.

Andrew Morris goes so far as to opine that the admission of propensity evidence under Rule
404(b) “produces grave consequences for thousands of criminal and civil defendants.”
Andrew J. Morris, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Fictitious Ban on Character
Reasoning from Other Crime Evidence, 17 REV. LITIG. 181, 184 (1998). The issue surely is
not whether the consequences are grave but whether they are inferentially appropriate.
6
Calvin Sharpe claims, on the strength of no cited empirical data whatever, that “the
probative value of all character evidence, including evidence of other crimes, is often not
very great, while it usually will have substantial prejudicial effects.” Calvin W. Sharpe,
Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other Crimes Evidence: A Sliding Scale of
Proof, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 556, 560 (1984). He continues: “Whatever the true
probability that commission of a crime will be followed by other criminal acts, it is highly
unlikely that the aggregate intuitions of a jury will produce an accurate assessment of the
worth of such evidence. Furthermore, even if statistics indicating the probability of a second
theft, given a first, were available, a jury's ability to ascribe to such evidence only its
properly proportioned weight is highly questionable.” Id. at 562 n.27.
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instruction, juries generally ignore the instruction and construe the prior
convictions as evidence of a criminal propensity. 7
H 5 : The defendant with prior crimes faces a Hobson’s choice in
selecting his trial tactics: either (a) he testifies, in which case his prior
crimes are more likely to be revealed and thus, by H 1 , his prospects of a
conviction will be greatly enhanced or (b) he does not testify, in which case
he faces a negative inference from his silence, despite judge’s instruction to
the contrary. Defendants—especially those with prior convictions—will
often elect silence, believing that the potential adverse inference from
silence would be less incriminating than the revelation of their prior crimes
would be. 8
One way or another, all of these hypotheses undergirding the
conventional wisdom about prior crimes evidence are empirically testable.
More than that, they have already been tested and most stand refuted or, at
least, rendered highly implausible. That notwithstanding, many judges and
legal scholars have been largely indifferent to, or unaware of, the empirical
evidence, apparently persuaded that their own intuitions, grounded in
decades of judicial experience, provide ample basis for the status quo,
however clumsily cobbled together it may be.
If these familiar hypotheses were true, they would constitute a triple
whammy directed against the admissibility of prior crimes evidence. H 2
would have it that in most criminal cases the evidence of prior crimes
7

Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson insisted that “all practicing lawyers know to be
unmitigated fiction” that “prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury.”
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1948). Justice Stewart concurred, insisting
that certain kinds of evidence “are at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so difficult to
discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to give such evidence the minimal weight it logically
deserves, whatever instructions the trial judge might give.” Bruton v. United States 391 U.S.
123, 138 (1967). Judge Learned Hand held that asking jurors to lay aside such information
as prior crimes requires an effort that “is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody’s else.”
Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (1932). Michael Saks confidently notes that
“[w]hen informed about a defendant witness’s prior crimes for the permissible purpose of
evaluating credibility, jurors use the information for the impermissible purpose of inferring
the likelihood that the defendant committed the currently charged crime.” Michael J. Saks,
What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 3, 26 (1997).
8
This conventional analysis is neatly summed up in the observation by Theodore
Eisenberg and Valerie Hans that “testifying is risky for defendants with prior records
because the records may be revealed on cross-examination.” Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie
Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the
Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1373 (2009). As our
subsequent analysis will make clear, this claim is half right: testifying does indeed make it
more likely that defendant’s prior crimes will be revealed but their revelation, should it
occur, does little to increase significantly the (already high) risk that the testifying defendant
with prior crimes will be convicted.
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scarcely qualifies as relevant. That notwithstanding, insists H 1 , jurors are
prone to inflate their genuine probative value. Finally, H 4 undercuts any
hope that jurors’ inferential mischievousness with prior crimes evidence can
be kept in check by a sternly worded instruction. If all this were true, it
would make sense to admit prior crimes evidence only under compelling
circumstances. But if, as we believe can be plausibly inferred from existing
empirical studies, none of these hypotheses (save H 4 ) is true, then a serious
reconsideration of current exclusionary practices concerning prior crimes
evidence should be in order.
This Article will show that the extant empirical evidence about how
real juries respond to evidence of prior crimes raises grave doubts about the
soundness of two of these five claims (specifically, H 1 and H 3 ). As for H 2
—the alleged marginal probative value of prior crimes information—we are
not persuaded that the relevance or its probative value of a prior crime is
chiefly what should be at stake. Finally, the tactical dilemma, H 5 , founded
as it is on the soundness of H 1 to H 4 , is likewise badly flawed.
B. THE INITIAL CONUNDRUM

Let us begin with a mildly surprising and seriously troubling pair of
statistics. Both come from a relatively recent large-scale study sponsored
by the National Council of State Courts (NCSC) of 358 criminal trials by
jury in four different urban jurisdictions of the country. The first set of
statistics is this:
(1A) The acquittal rate for those defendants with prior crimes, whose
prior crimes were not admitted as evidence to the jury was 23.9% 9, while
(1B) The acquittal rate for those defendants with prior crimes, whose
prior crimes were admitted as evidence to jurors, was 20.3%.10
The first point worthy of note, although it is by no means the most
surprising one, is that juries, fully aware of a defendant’s prior crimes, are
prepared to acquit in about two cases out of ten.11 This statistic would
appear to give the lie to the idea, entertained in some circles, that admitting
evidence of prior crimes is the kiss of death for a defendant. The more
9

Daniel Givelber, Lost Innocence: Speculation and Data About the Acquitted, 42 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1167, 1190 (2005). It should be noted here (and below where the NCSC data
are referenced) that the NCSC database divided trial results into “acquittals,” “convictions,”
or “hung juries.” Analysts of this data set generally adopt the convention that “hung” results
are counted as half acquittals and half convictions. Others exclude the hung trials altogether.
These differing conventions explain why there are small discrepancies in the results reported
by various authors. For descriptions of the data set, see note 71, infra.
10
Id.
11
That compares with the mean acquittal rate in all the trials in the NCSC study
(including those of defendants without priors) of about three-in-ten. See infra note 71.
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intriguing point about this pair of statistics is that, among those defendants
who do have prior crimes, the conviction rate among those whose prior
crimes never emerge explicitly is only modestly lower than the conviction
rate among defendants whose prior crimes become known. Specifically,
juries convicted defendants whose prior crimes were unknown to them
about 76% of the time and they convicted defendants with prior crimes
known to them slightly less than 80% of the time. This appears to reinforce
the point that a jury’s learning of prior crimes directly through the evidence
is not the inflammatory, unfairly prejudicial, conviction-ensuring
information it is often depicted as being. While the conviction rates in the
two sets are not identical, there appears to have been only a modest increase
in the conviction rate when jurors learned directly through evidence of the
defendant’s prior crimes. 12
If that is so, the strenuous efforts of legal experts and defense attorneys
to restrict the admissibility of prior crimes evidence seem misplaced.
Admitting evidence of prior crimes apparently leads to few additional
convictions. Under such circumstances, railing against the admissibility of
prior crimes on the grounds that they unfairly disadvantage defendants with
criminal records is unnecessary hyperbole.
Now consider a second and rather more salient statistic, again from the
NCSC study:
(2) The acquittal rate for defendants with no prior convictions was
almost twice as great as 13 the acquittal rate for defendants with prior
convictions. 14
Not only is a defendant with no prior crimes about twice as likely to be
acquitted as a defendant with priors, but in addition, as we shall see below,
having prior crimes turns out to be one of the strongest predictors of a
guilty verdict that we have available, stronger even than the testimony of an

12

Obviously, the magnitude of change in the acquittal numbers is larger than in
convictions because the absolute numbers of acquittals are smaller. Still, the acquittal rate
for those with unknown priors is only about 17.5% higher than for those with known priors.
In absolute numbers, in 15 out of 74 cases there were acquittals when the priors were known.
Givelber, supra note 9, at 1190. Had there been only three more acquittals in this subset, the
rates would have been almost identical. Thus, even the larger disparity does not suggest that
knowledge of priors has a dramatic affect on juries.
13
Specifically, it is 184% higher. Very similar data are reported by Givelber, supra note
9, at 1190 tbl.1 (reporting an acquittal rate 216% higher).
14
Givelber, supra note 9, at 1190. So far as we are aware, Professor Givelber was the
first analyst to draw attention to the fact that conviction rates for defendants with prior
crimes in the NCSC study were significantly higher than conviction rates for defendants
without them, regardless of whether the jury was informed of those priors. “It is whether or
not the defendant has a criminal record—not whether the jury learns about it—that has the
greatest influence on the acquittal/conviction decision.” Id.
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eyewitness to the crime who fingers the defendant. 15 And it remains a
powerful predictor of the jurors’ verdict even when the jurors have not been
informed of its existence. To put it mildly, this result is puzzling, especially
given that (1A) and (1B) entail that a jury, upon learning of the prior
convictions of a defendant, is not much more likely to convict him than if
the priors had not appeared. In short: jurors are much more likely to
convict defendants with priors than those without, even while the jury’s
being informed of the priors does relatively little to increase the conviction
rate.
The message to the hapless defendant with a record of previous crimes
seems clear but perplexing: “Given your priors, it’s very likely you’ll be
convicted, but don’t worry too much about whether the jury learns about
those priors since that makes little difference to the outcome!”
That advice is particularly pertinent if the defendant decides not to
testify. In cases where the defendant did not testify and his prior
convictions nonetheless became known at trial, the conviction rate was
72.7%. 16 For non-testifying defendants whose priors did not become
public, the conviction rate was 71.4%.17 The moral here seems to be that if
a defendant chooses not to testify, it scarcely matters whether his priors
become known. How often has defense counsel, having already decided
that the defendant will not testify, fought valiantly to have prior crimes
excluded under Rules 404 or 403? If these data from the NCSC study are
representative, such efforts are largely futile, not because they will fail at
excluding the evidence of prior crimes (usually they succeed) but because
such exclusion will make little difference to the outcome of the trial. Nor
do prior crimes seem to matter much if a defendant does testify. In cases
where defendants testify and priors become known, defendants are
convicted about 77.8% of the time; when they testify and their prior crimes
do not become known, they are convicted about 76.6% of the time. 18
Again, not much depends on the admissions of the priors.
Lest these results seem to strain credibility, we hasten to add that two
other studies of long runs of trials, including the classic University of
Chicago Jury Project, lead to the same conclusion; 19 to wit, that jurors are
much more likely to convict those with prior crimes than those without,
even though they do not convict those whose priors have been admitted

15
16
17
18
19

See the discussion of Myers’s results below, infra notes 49–51.
Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 8, at 1381.
Id.
Id.
For a discussion of these studies, see infra Part II.B.
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with a significantly higher frequency than they convict those with priors
unknown to the jury.
It will take us a while to get to the bottom of this set of puzzles. When
we eventually do, we will discover that existing policies on the
admissibility of prior crimes evidence are deeply flawed, because either
they are built upon a set of erroneous a priori assumptions about juror
inferences or they ignore critical aspects of police and prosecutorial
behavior.
II. EVIDENCE FOR THE MYTHIC CHARACTER OF COMMON ASSUMPTIONS
ABOUT PRIOR CRIMES EVIDENCE
A. WHERE NOT TO LOOK: THIRTY YEARS OF MOCK JURY STUDIES

There have been numerous studies of how mock jurors handle prior
crimes information. Most adopt variants of the following design: mock
jurors are split into two groups; group (a) is given details of a criminal
case—real or imaginary—and asked for a verdict (sometimes involving
inter-juror deliberation and sometimes not); group (b) is given the same
information but also told that the defendant has a record of prior crimes and
asked for its verdict; group (b) is instructed to ignore the information about
prior crimes; and finally, conviction and acquittal rates for the two groups
are compared.
The results, as they say, are all over the map. Doob and Kirshenbaum
reported that group (b) was more likely to convict than group (a).20 Sealy
and Cornish reported that evidence of prior crimes played a role in cases
involving minor crimes (especially theft and vandalism) but not in more
serious cases (rape and homicide). The latter also found that the
introduction of evidence of convictions for dissimilar crimes modestly
reduced the conviction rate! 21 Hans and Doob claimed that 40% of jurors
in group (b) voted to convict while none of the jurors in group (a) voted to
convict.22
Thompson et al. reported that inadmissible priors evidence was
utilized by mock jurors only when it was favorable to defendants. 23 Caretta
and Moreland found that, after deliberation, there was no difference in
20

Anthony N. Doob & Hershi M. Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence of the Effect
of s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act upon an Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88, 90–91 (1973).
21
W. R. Cornish & A. P. Sealy &, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L. REV.
208, 218.
22
Valerie Hans & Anthony Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the
Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L. Q. 235, 243 (1976).
23
William Thompson et al., Inadmissible Evidence and Juror Verdicts, 40 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 453, 455 (1981).
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conviction rates between groups (a) and (b). 24 Wissler and Sachs found that
jurors given prior crimes information convicted 75% of the time when the
prior crime convictions were similar to the current case, 52.5% of the time
when the priors were dissimilar, and that mock jurors with no knowledge of
the priors convicted only 42.5% of the time. 25
Rind et al. found that prior crimes information plays a role in
conviction decisions about minor crimes but not serious ones. 26 Greene and
Dodge reported that group (b) convicted 40% of the time while group (a),
ignorant of prior crimes, convicted only 17% of the time. 27 Lloyd-Bostock
observed that jurors, given recent and similar priors, had a 66% rate of
conviction while group (a) voted to convict 51.47% of the time. 28
A conscientious judge, faced with having to make a Rule 403 decision
about prior crimes evidence, and eager to inform herself by doing a quick
and dirty meta-analysis of mock jury studies on the subject, would have to
come away empty handed from this congeries of conflicting results. If of a
mind to believe that prior crimes evidence has only a very limited effect on
jury decisions, there are plenty of studies to back up that prior disposition.
If inclined to think that prior crimes evidence scandalizes jury sentiment,
there are ample studies to support that conclusion as well.
Apart from the contradictory character of the results emerging from
these studies, there is a second powerful reason for doubting some of the
generalizations derived from them. The logic driving the design behind
most of these mock jury studies deliberately involves giving to mock jurors
details of cases, real or fabricated, where the evidence is quite ambiguous
and non-decisive. 29 In such cases, adding information about prior crimes
can often prove dispositive, nudging jurors over the hump represented by
the standard of proof.

24
Thomas R. Caretta & Richard L. Moreland, The Direct and Indirect Effects of
Inadmissible Evidence, 13 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291, 297 (1983).
25
Roselle Wissler & Michael Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When
Jurors use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 43 (1985).
26
Bruce Rind et al., The Effect of Crime Seriousness on Simulated Jurors’ Use of
Inadmissible Evidence, 135 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 417, 418 (1995).
27
Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, The Influence of Prior-Record Evidence on Juror
Decision Making, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 67, 72 (1995).
28
Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects on Juries of Hearing About the Defendant’s Previous
Criminal Record: A Simulation Study, CRIM. L. REV. 734, 743 (2000). Lloyd-Bostock
claims her results are a “clear” confirmation of a “prejudicial effect,” when all the evidence
apparently shows is an increase in the probability assigned to guilt by mock jurors when they
learn of prior crimes. Id. at 753. That increase that may or may not be justified by the
probative weight of the prior crimes evidence. Id.
29
Most of the mock jury results summarized above depend on the analysis of “close”
cases.
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Does this fact exhibit that jurors attribute unwarrantedly potent
probatory significance to prior crimes evidence? Pretty clearly, it does not.
If one selects or designs cases that are on, or close to, the margin between
guilt proved and guilt not proved, then almost any sort of additional
inculpatory evidence could be sufficient to change many jurors’ votes from
acquit to convict. For instance, an additional incriminating eyewitness or
an additional piece of inculpatory physical evidence could easily tip opinion
in a close case from one outcome to the other. No one would argue that
evidence of such tipping shows that jurors give disproportionate weight to
the evidence that caused the shift. By definition, if the case—absent
additional evidence—is already close to the standard of proof, then any
additional relevant evidence may be sufficient to shift opinion, even if
jurors do not give excessive weight to it. Given that most real criminal
cases are not borderline cases,30 and that genuinely borderline cases are
likely to be tipped by almost any additional inculpatory evidence, we ought
not infer from any mock juror study that focuses principally on the role of
prior crimes in close cases that jurors generally give disproportionate
weight to such evidence.
Of course the fact that we should not infer from these studies that
jurors give disproportionate weight to defendants’ priors does not mean that
they do not do so. It only tells us that, when cases—whether mock or
real—without priors are close to the borderline and priors are then added to
the mix, thereby shifting the mock verdict from acquittal to conviction, that
shift warrants no inference about whether the learning of those priors
created a situation that unfairly prejudiced the defendant. What such shifts
do show vividly is that, at least among mock jurors, the instruction to draw
30

Another myth about criminal justice that is called into question by data is the microeconomic explanation that most cases that go to trial tend to be close. If they are not close
cases, the argument runs, a plea bargain or dismissal will often be entered, leaving factually
close cases to predominate at trial. This is disconfirmed by at least three sources. First, if
cases were close, the requirement of unanimity should produce substantial hung juries, yet
the rate for hung juries on all counts hovers around 7.5%. PAULA L. HANNOFORD-AGOR ET
AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM? 43 (2002), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_Juries_HungJuriesProblemPub.pdf.
Second, close cases should be difficult to decide, yet the average length of jury deliberations
in noncapital felonies is three hours, two for misdemeanors, and a rather brief six for capital
cases. GREGORY E. MIZE, ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE-OF-THE-STATES
SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 38 (2007), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/d_research/cjs/pdf/SOSCompendiumFinal.pdf. Third, if cases
were close, there should be substantial judge–jury disagreement, but there is not; and with
regard to what does exist, “[w]e find little evidence that evidentiary complexity or legal
complexity help explain rates of judge–jury disagreement. The judges’ lower conviction
threshold seems to be driving most of the difference.” Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge–
Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven & Zeisel’s The
American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171, 173 (2005).
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no conclusions from known priors about a defendant’s propensity to crime
is flagrantly ignored. As we will see shortly, such instructions may be
likewise ignored in real trials.
B. FORTY YEARS OF STUDIES OF REAL TRIALS

More promising and less ambiguous as a data source is a smaller class
of empirical studies involving lengthy runs of real trials. In the three that
we shall be discussing, questionnaires were given to judges and jurors and
records were kept about which cases involved prior crimes evidence and
which did not. The first of these is reported in Kalven and Zeisel’s classic,
The American Jury. 31 The second such study, already mentioned, grows
out of an ambitious project initiated by the National Center of State Courts
and published as Are Hung Juries a Problem? 32 It included some 358
felony trials held in four American cities in 2000 and 2001, utilizing
detailed trial and post-trial questionnaire data from jurors and judges.
Taking a cue from Eisenberg and Hans, we will focus principally on those
trials in this study involving defendants with prior criminal records. 33
There were 251 such trials in all. 34 While ostensibly targeted at the
problem of hung juries, its data have proven a fertile source for various
scholars interested in exploring questions of the impact of prior criminal
records on jury outcomes. A third medium-scale study of 201 jury trials in
Indianapolis between 1974 and 1976, done by Martha Myers, although less
widely cited, will also be discussed. 35

31

HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
HANNOFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 30.
33
See Eisenberg & Hans, supra, note 8.
34
Id. at 1371 tbl.1.
35
Martha Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 781 (1979).
32
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First a brief summary of the three studies is in order:

Table 1
Chicago 36

NCSC 37

Myers 38

Number of Trials

3,576

358

201

Prior Convictions

Chicago 39

NCSC 40

Defendants with priors

47%

79%

Defendants without priors

53%

21%

The rise over thirty years in the proportion of criminal defendants with prior
convictions is interesting in its own right but that is not our focus here. By
contrast, the following figures are highly pertinent:

Table 2
Conviction Rates

Chicago 41

NCSC 42

Defendants with priors

75%

76.1%

Defendants without priors

58%

56.1%

Judging by this data, defendants with prior crimes are roughly one-third
more likely to be convicted than defendants without such a record—29%
36

KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 31, at 47.
HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 30, at 32.
38
Myers, supra note 35, at 785.
39
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 31, at 145.
40
Givelber, supra note 9, at 1190 tbl.2.
41
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 31, at 160–61. This pair of statistics is not quite what it
purports to be. For a set of arcane reasons, Kalven and Zeisel defined, for purposes of this
table, a “defendant without priors” as one who (a) had no priors or (b) took the stand or
(c) managed to hide his priors from the jury. Any defendant who failed to satisfy at least one
of those conditions was counted as a “defendant with priors.” See id. at 159 n.17. Although
their questionnaire solicited information directly about which defendants did and did not
have prior convictions (in the usual sense of that term), they did not include that data in this
computation.
42
Givelber, supra note 9, at 1190. Our own analysis of the NCSC data suggests that
these figures are closer to 73.5% and 52% respectively. Still, the gap in conviction rates
between defendants with and those without priors is similarly striking on either method of
tallying the results.
37
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more likely in the Chicago study and 36% more likely in the NCSC study.
Put differently, a defendant without priors was almost twice as likely to be
acquitted as a defendant with priors was, even if the jury was not informed
of those priors. 43 This discrepancy in acquittal rates shows up, even though
in the NCSC study most defendants with priors did not testify, and even
though the prior crimes of non-testifying defendants became known to
jurors through evidence in only about one case in ten.

Table 3
Giving Testimony

Chicago 44

NCSC 45

Defendant with no record

91%

60%

Defendant with record

74%

45%

Testimony & Priors

Chicago 46

NCSC47

Jury learns of priors if defendant testifies

72%

52%

Jury learns of priors if defendant does not
testify

13%

9%

47

43

The Chicago Jury Project showed a 25% acquittal rate for defendants with priors
versus 42% for those without, and the NCSC study’s rates were 23.9% versus 43.9%.
44
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 31, at 146.
45
Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 8, at 1357. These figures come from their summary of
the NCSC results. The actual figures that appear in their Table I suggest that defendants
with no priors testify 62% of the time. Id. at 1371.
A strong word of caution is in order with respect to the typicality of some of the data we
will be citing from the NCSC project. While the sample size of the entire set of trials (358
trials) is impressive enough, as we focus on issues that segment that sample down to smaller
and smaller subsets, e.g., “defendants with priors who do not testify and are convicted,” the
risk increases that these results might not be indicative of general patterns. That is one
reason why, where possible, we have sought to include data from the much larger Chicago
Jury Project as a way of lending statistical heft to our surmises. Where the Chicago data are
unavailable, we utilize the NCSC data standing alone on the assumption that some data are
preferable to purely a priori intuitions about (say) whether testifying defendants are more
likely to be acquitted than silent ones are.
46
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 31, at 147.
47
Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 8, at 1373–75. Both these figures are almost certainly
mildly inflated above the usual norm because of the vicissitudes of Rules 413 and 414.
Those rules permit the routine admission of similar prior crimes evidence in cases of rape
and sexual assault. Since about 5% of all cases in the NCSC sample fell in this category (we
can infer that) in cases not involving sex crimes, these figures would have been even lower
than they appear. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 30, at 36 tbl.3.3. Routine admission
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One might be inclined to attribute the marked difference between the
proportion of defendants with priors who are convicted (76%) and the
proportion of defendants without priors who are convicted (56%) to the fact
that 29% of the former group have their priors revealed to the jury. The
idea might be that jurors—upon learning about the priors of this subset—
are much more likely to convict them. Natural as that inference might
seem, it is not sustainable, as the next table vividly shows:

Table 4
Conviction Rates of:

NCSC 48

Non-testifying defendants whose priors were unknown to jury

71.4%

Non-testifying defendants whose priors were known to jury

72.7%

Here, the conviction rates for non-testifying defendants with unknown
priors and for those with known priors are virtually indistinguishable.
Givelber and Farrell, analyzing a slightly larger portion of the NCSC data
base than the one just reported, arrived at a similar bottom line: among 177
defendants with priors unknown to the jury, the conviction rate was 78.8%;
among 72 defendants with known priors, it was 81.4%. 49
Virtually the same pattern repeats itself if we look to conviction rates
among defendants with priors who do testify:

Table 5
Conviction Rates

NCSC 50

Testifying defendants whose priors were unknown to jury

76.6%

Testifying defendants whose priors were known to jury

77.8%

Whatever else is going on here, we apparently cannot put the large
difference in conviction rates between those with priors and those without
them down to the revelation of priors. If that explanation were true, then

of prior crimes in cases where the criminal record itself is one element of the crime (e.g., a
felon possessing or purchasing a firearm) likewise distorts the record.
48
Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 8, at 1381 tbl.8.
49
Daniel Givelber & Amy Farrell, Judges and Juries: The Defense Case and Differences
in Acquittal Rates, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 31, 38 tbl.1 (2008).
50
Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 8, at 1381 tbl.8.
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we should expect to see a striking difference in conviction rates between
those whose priors were admitted and those whose priors were excluded.
The data plainly refute that hypothesis.
Consider one last pertinent statistic: in Martha Myers’s study of 201
trials, she found that among those going to trial, the average defendant had
2.7 prior convictions. “Juries,” she claims, “were more likely to convict if
the defendant had numerous prior convictions . . . ,” 51 even though in most
cases jurors never learned about the priors directly through the evidence.
More concretely, she reports a regression coefficient of .182 (significant at
p < 0.1 on the verdict) for defendants with prior crimes. 52 In Myers’s study,
the existence of prior crimes, largely unknown to jurors, was a more
successful predictor of conviction than were (a) eyewitness identifications
of the defendant, (b) expert testimony against the defendant, (c) the
recovery of stolen property, or (d) the recovery of the weapon used in the
crime. 53
How, then, are we to explain the fact that defendants with priors have
high conviction rates, whether the jury has been informed of them or not?
That is the puzzle for the next Part of this Article.
III. SOLVING THE MYSTERY OF UNKNOWN PRIOR CONVICTIONS
We can abduct only two plausible explanations for the data that we
have discussed. The first focuses on the jury’s inferential process and the
second on prosecutorial behavior. As to the inferential process, perhaps
jurors convict those with unknown priors and with known priors at more or
less the same rate because they have already concluded that those
defendants whose priors they did not hear about nonetheless have priors
that were suppressed. As to prosecutorial behavior, perhaps jurors attach no
probatory significance to prior crimes but priors are associated with the
strength of the government’s evidence, because of prosecutorial or police
decisions and resource investments. As we shall see, the end result in each
case is the same—the criminal justice system’s fetish about excluding prior
crimes is ill-conceived.
We have seen that somewhere between half and three-quarters of
defendants who go to trial have prior convictions. Jurors are explicitly
informed of those priors through evidence about 10% of the time, unless the
defendant takes the stand, in which case the revelation rate of priors jumps
to about half or even (in the Chicago study) three-quarters. Since taking the
stand was unusual among defendants with priors, it is fair to surmise that
51
52
53

Myers, supra note 35, at 792.
Id. at 793 tbl.2.
Id.
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jurors learned of the defendants’ prior convictions from the evidence in
only about a third of the cases in which defendants have them. Despite that
lack of information, jurors convicted defendants with priors significantly
more often than they convicted defendants without a record and they
convicted defendants with unknown priors about as often as they convicted
defendants with known priors.
One possible solution to the conundrum is that jurors, even if never
informed of the existence of prior convictions, can fairly readily deduce that
information for themselves. Consider the typical behavior of a defendant
with a clean record. He is free to announce that he has no prior
convictions, 54 he can take the stand himself, and he can introduce character
witnesses, without fear of such acts unleashing the prosecutor to present
evidence of prior crimes. 55 By contrast, the defendant with priors
provisionally excluded by the judge will do none of these things. He cannot
point to a clean record, since he does not have one; he cannot call character
witnesses without fear of the prosecutor then introducing his priors as
pertinent to whatever opinion or reputation evidence the witness offers; and,
if he takes the stand, he runs the risk of triggering the introduction of his
prior convictions.
In short, if the defendant has no prior convictions, the jury is apt to be
told that in no uncertain terms. If the defendant has prior convictions and
the judge has authorized their admission, once again the jury will know the
situation. But even when the judge has excluded a defendant’s priors, the
latter must adopt a very different profile during trial than a defendant
without priors would, a profile that should leave few jurors in doubt that he
has prior convictions, even if the latter go unmentioned explicitly in the
trial. 56 In short, jurors will generally know when the defendant has no prior

54
As Givelber and Farrell note: “[W]hen the defendant has no [criminal] record, the jury
is likely to hear this fact.” See supra note 49, at 47 n.10.
55
In the Kalven–Zeisel study, 25% of all defendants presented character witnesses.
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 31, at 137.
56
We say “explicitly” because other rules of evidence facilitate such inferences by
allowing in evidence of, or relevant to, prior crimes evidence. Rules 413–15 admit prior bad
acts which could be prior crimes, as does Rule 404(b). It should be noted that many of the
grounds for admission of prior bad act evidence under Rule 404(b) actually involve a
propensity inference even though they are supposedly admissible on some other ground than
propensity. For a discussion, see RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND
CASES 244–57 (4th ed. 2006) and Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused’s Criminal
History, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 201 (2005). As Reed puts the point: “Someone . . . might jump to
the conclusion that courts admit uncharged misconduct in a backhanded, under-the-table way
that conceals the real agenda of the criminal justice system. That view might lead . . . [them]
to conclude that a judicial conspiracy exists to convict the accused on the basis of bad
character while seeming to prohibit conviction on account of bad character.” Id. at 248.
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record and can usually infer when he is a serial felon. Short of curtailing a
defendant’s right to present evidence of his clean record (which would be
wholly unacceptable), there seems to be no way to protect the defendant
with prior convictions from jurors’ inferences that he has them. 57
Jurors, we submit, could plausibly make such inferences as these. The
key question, however, is whether they do so. We have two kinds of
evidence that seems to bear out the hypothesis in question. This hypothesis
finds support in Sally Lloyd-Bostock’s study of more than 200 mock trials,
in which the acquittal rates for those defendants with known “similar” and
“recent” priors—attributes to which jurors are thought to give special

There are other rules of evidence that have similar effects, such as the common law res
gestae rule. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelreid, The Second Coming of Res Gestae: A
Procedural Approach to Untangling the “Inextricably Intertwined” Theory for Admitting
Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 719 (2010). It may
be the case that these other rules largely overwhelm the exclusionary rule of Rule 404.
57
Alex Stein has offered a quite different analysis of the situation of the innocent
defendant with prior convictions. Knowing that his priors may be revealed if he testifies
(and aware that such a revelation may make his conviction more likely), he will nonetheless
be disposed to “tell his story.” According to Stein, “the defendant’s readiness to risk
impeachment by prior convictions might signal credibility.” ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF
EVIDENCE LAW 165 (2005). He adds: “By testifying about his or her innocence, the
defendant conveys to fact-finders that his or her exculpatory testimony is true and that there
are no specific reasons for disbelieving it . . . . Because the defendant’s signaling is costly, it
indicates the defendant’s credibility as a witness . . . .” Moreover, adds Stein, “many guilty
defendants prefer to separate from the pool by not testifying in their defense,” because the
true stories told on the stand by the innocent defendant are more likely to stand up to
prosecutorial cross-examination than the fictitious stories concocted by the guilty: “Reasons
discrediting the defendant’s self-exonerating testimony predominately appear in cases
featuring guilty defendants.” Id. Stein’s argument amounts to the claim that innocent
defendants with prior convictions have a strong incentive to testify since their willingness to
run the risk of revelation of their priors betokens to the jurors the truth and sincerity of their
testimony, whereas those who are guilty will not take the stand because their false stories
would likely be shattered by cross-examination.
This analysis is directly disconfirmed by the data. According to the NCSC data, (a) 45%
of defendants with priors testified; (b) most defendants with priors who chose to testify were
convicted (77%) and thus were presumably guilty; and, most tellingly, (c) a testifying
defendant with priors was more likely to be convicted than was a non-testifying defendant
with priors (77% versus 72%). The inconsistency of this data with Stein’s argument is
obvious. First, if testifying signals innocence, the signal is not being received by the jury
that convicts 77% of those with priors who testify. Second, according to the anti-pooling
argument, those who do not testify are predominantly guilty and those who testify
predominantly innocent, yet in the NCSC study, juries convicted more of those who testified
than those who did not. In other words, it does not follow from any of this data therefore
that the guilty avoid taking the stand and the innocent signal their innocence by testifying
unless defendants make irrational choices and jury verdicts are highly unreliable. Thus, his
argument amounts to an explanation of massive irrationality and a prediction of enormous
error rates, all within the confines of an analysis predicated upon rational choice.
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probatory weight—were virtually indistinguishable from those whose priors
were wholly unknown (77.1% and 77.8% respectively). 58 The second sign
that jurors make such inferences is already before us in the form of data
patterns from the NCSC study showing that conviction rates for defendants
with priors known to the jury are almost indistinguishable from conviction
rates of defendants with unknown priors. Supposing that priors are
positively relevant to guilt, and assuming no other systematic differences
between the cases, 59 we would expect defendants with known priors to be
convicted at a much higher rate than defendants without known priors,

58

Lloyd-Bostock, supra note 28, at 745. In her study of more than 200 mock jurors,
presented with an initially weak case, and then told (in most cases) of prior crimes with
varying characteristics, the results that emerged are quite contrary to standard intuitions.
Here are some of the more salient data:

Footnote Table 1
Nature of Known Priors

% Convicted

Priors unmentioned

22.2

Told “no priors”

16.7

Old similar priors

5.6

Recent dissimilar priors

2.9

Recent similar priors

22.9

Old dissimilar priors

2.8

Note that her study does not suffer from the methodological problems of the mock jury
studies trying to determine if the use of priors, standing alone, is unfairly prejudicial. She is
varying the type of priors. The most curious result on this study is the “Told ‘no priors’”
data. One would think that conviction rates in that setting should be considerably lower.
One possible—although also possibly ad hoc—response is that in the study the jurors were
told only that the defendant “has no previous convictions,” and in the judge’s instructions
that “you have heard that the defendant has no previous convictions.” Id. at 740. With no
exploration of the defendant’s good character, jurors may very well have speculated about
conduct that did not result in convictions, and indeed that inference might have been
motivated in part by the unelaborated information and instruction. The instruction, “you
have heard,” seems to us particularly likely to be viewed as ambiguous. In any event, the
complex interaction of decision makers and instructions is well known. See, e.g., Saul M.
Kassin & Samuel M. Sommers, Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to Disregard, and the
Jury: Substantive Versus Procedural Considerations, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1046 (1997); Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial
Instruction to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
469 (2006).
59
In subpart III.C, we explore one possible systematic difference below with regard to
state behavior in the face of priors.
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unless jurors infer the existence of priors even where they have not been
informed of them. 60
Let us suppose, then, that jurors generally have a good idea which
defendants have prior convictions and which have a clean record. The next
obvious question is: what do jurors do with such information?
A. THE CLEAN-RECORD, GUILT-DEFLATION HYPOTHESIS.

Begin with what may be the simplest hypothesis. Our focus thus far
has been on those defendants with prior crimes and their conviction rate.
But, of course, the mirror image of this is the set of defendants with clean
records and their acquittal rate. If we focus on that question to start with,
we might entertain the following hypothesis: we have already noted that
defendants with clean records, whether guilty or innocent, have several
procedural advantages. Most importantly, they can see to it that their lack
of prior convictions is brought vigorously to the jurors’ attention. Besides
this and other procedural advantages, such defendants likewise stand to gain
if jurors, knowing that these defendants have no prior convictions, are more
inclined to give them the benefit of the doubt in cases that might go either
way. 61 If jurors are likely to be swayed by such considerations, we would
appear to have a partial explanation for why the conviction rate for
defendants without prior convictions is substantially less than that for serial
offenders. We say “partial” because the frequency of close cases, as that
term is usually understood, culminating in an acquittal is too low to explain
the magnitude of the difference in conviction rates between defendants with

60

One possible explanation for the data involving defendants with priors is that motions
in limine will provide the defense attorney with information about the admissibility of priors,
allowing him to make the calculation of the likelihood of a guilty verdict with full
information prior to the defendant testifying, and that the predictions about odds of
conviction are well calibrated. There are numerous difficulties with this explanation. First,
the attorneys’ predictions are not just “well-calibrated,” they are astonishingly wellcalibrated, and thus the story is implausible. Moreover, they lose this astonishing calibration
ability when it comes to making decisions about whether defendants without prior records
should testify. Second, this explanation requires not just amazing calibration ability but full
knowledge. Unfortunately, the latter condition does not exist. It is common practice for
judges not to give definitive resolutions to the motions in limine that are essential for the
explanation. The third problem is that this assumes that the only knowledge of priors will
come from their formal revelation at trial. That is false. There are various mechanisms for
this information to get out. See supra note 56. Fourth, and perhaps most devastating to this
speculation, is that it is hard to make sense of a claim that the lawyers are good at calibrating
odds of guilty verdicts when most people who go to trial are convicted. In most of those
cases, the defendant would have been better off with a plea bargain.
61
Kalven and Zeisel conjecture that “[t]he jury’s broad rule of thumb here, presumably,
is that as a matter of human experience it is especially unlikely that a person with no prior
record will commit a crime . . . .” KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 31, at 179.
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no priors and serial offenders. 62 We should also note, for it matters for the
later argument, that if this hypothesis were correct, then there would be
little or no justification for a blanket policy excluding prior convictions
since, ex hypothesi, the de facto role of priors in a trial is not to castigate the
serial offender per se but to give a boost to the defendant with a clean
record.
B. THE SERIAL-OFFENDER, GUILT-INFLATION HYPOTHESIS

As a second hypothesis, consider the flip side of this story. Imagine,
as before, that jurors are often able to separate reliably those with and those
without prior convictions, even when none is mentioned. When a defendant
presents no character evidence or witnesses and no proof that he has never
been previously convicted, jurors would be irrational not to infer that he has
prior convictions. Suppose, further, that unlike in our first story, jurors are
not especially inclined to let even defendants with a clean record off the
hook easily.
By contrast, we might suppose, the typical juror is apt to think the
worst of a serial offender. He believes—legally or not—that someone with
a record of prior crimes is more likely to have committed the instant crime
than a person without a record. Accordingly, on this hypothesis, the juror
judges the person without a record entirely on the merits of the case but
judges the serial offender, in part, by what he imagines to be his criminal
past and perhaps by what he projects to be his criminal future, were he
acquitted. As in our first hypothesis, jurors do not usually have to be rocket
scientists to tell whether the defendant before them is probably a serial
offender with priors.
Such a scenario would explain what we have seen in the data, namely,
a pattern of strikingly higher conviction rates for serial offenders than for
those without any priors. In fact, it explains more than that. Let us return
briefly to the puzzling fact from the NCSC study that the conviction rate for
non-testifying defendants with priors unknown to the jury (71.4%) is
virtually the same as that for defendants whose priors have been introduced
into evidence (72.7%). One’s first instinct on reading this statistic is to
construe this as evidence that jurors pay little mind to priors in reaching
their verdict. But if the serial-offender, guilt-inflation hypothesis is right,
the proper explanation is quite different. The conviction rates are so close
in the two cases not because priors do not matter to juries but because jurors
are quite willing to infer the existence of priors from various features of the
trial.

62

See supra subpart II.B.
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There is an alternative way of describing what may be going on here.
It is conceivable that jurors, having decided that the defendant has already
been convicted of a crime (or several of them), conclude not so much that
the existence of prior convictions makes it more likely that a defendant
committed this particular crime but rather that the existence of those priors
implies that a defendant should be adjudged by a less demanding standard
of proof than would be used for a person facing his first felony conviction.63
It is common knowledge that felons with multiple priors are much more
likely to offend again (and again) than are those with a clean record. 64 If
the standard of proof is understood as a mechanism for balancing the costs
of mistakes, here a false acquittal or a false conviction, it would not be
unreasonable for jurors to decide that the costs of falsely acquitting a
potentially serial felon were greater than the costs of falsely acquitting a
person without a record. If they make such a back-of-the-envelope
calculation, they will surely arrive at the conclusion that the level of proof
necessary to justify convicting a serial felon should be lower than that
necessary to convict a person with a clean record. 65 We already know that
the prevailing standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt is so
ambiguous and ill-defined that plenty of latitude is left to jurors to calibrate
their construal of its meaning to the peculiarities of specific cases.66 If this
is what is happening, jurors are not necessarily assuming that the existence
of prior crimes is relevant in the technical sense that they increase the
likelihood of guilt in the instant case but are concluding rather that less
proof is necessary to convict someone who has already shown an
indifference to the law and his fellow citizens than is appropriate for
someone with a previously clean slate.
Under such circumstances, the logic driving Rule 403 is simply
inapplicable to the question of prior crimes. That rule is written as if the
balancing act required of a judge is one of comparing the probative value of

63

See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 8, at 1386. Eisenberg and Hans similarly observe
that the NCSC data suggest that “[t]he conviction threshold appears to differ for defendants
with and without criminal records.” Id.
64
And in this case the common knowledge happens to actually qualify as knowledge by
virtue of being true. See, e.g., Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, Deadly Dilemmas II: Bail
and Crime, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (2010).
65
This argument is explored at length in Larry Laudan, The Rules of Trial, Political
Morality and the Costs of Error: Or, Is Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Doing More
Harm Than Good?, LAW & PHIL. (forthcoming July 2011).
66
The case for the interpretative flexibility of “beyond a reasonable doubt” has been
made most cogently by Erik Lillquist in his Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory
and the Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85 (2002); see also LARRY LAUDAN,
TRUTH, ERROR AND CRIMINAL LAW ch. 2 (Gerald Postema ed., 2006).
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the prior crimes against their prejudicial impact.67 But if jurors use prior
crimes—whether revealed or inferred—not to enhance the likelihood of
guilt but to trigger the lowering of the standard of proof, then talk of the
relevance, probative value, or non-relevance of priors is beside the point.
On this way of looking at things, priors do not, or at least need not, raise the
likelihood that defendant committed the instant crime; instead, they lower
the bar needed for a conviction. If that sounds vaguely like a case of
Tweedledum and Tweedledee, it should not. There is a world of difference
between believing that “priors make guilt more probable” and believing that
“priors lower the bar for conviction.” The first assertion is essentially a
matter of inductive logic (in which questions of evidential relevance are
crucial); the second is a matter of fixing an appropriate standard of proof,
which—being a question of political morality—has nothing whatever to do
with relevance and probative value. Jurors could reasonably believe that
the standard of proof should be lower for a serial offender than for a person
without any priors, even if they did not believe that the existence of priors
significantly altered the probability that defendant committed the crime
with which he is charged. 68
Of course, our two general scenarios are not mutually exclusive. It
may be that both are going on routinely in the legal system at the same
time: jurors, having enough cues to distinguish serial offenders from those
with a clean record, may be disposed both to go harder on a defendant who
comes in the former class and to go easier on one in the latter.
There is another statistic worth throwing into our stew. Several mock
jury studies report that jurors, when learning of the existence of prior
convictions for crimes similar to those in the instant case, are more likely to
convict than when they learned nothing about the priors. This is intuitive.
More surprising is the fact that some studies report that when mock juries
learn of prior convictions for a dissimilar crime, they are less likely to

67

FED. R. EVID. 403.
We share this view, although we should note that it is not universally embraced; one
concept of “prejudice” includes the effect of evidence on juror utility functions. See ALLEN
ET AL., supra note 56, at 164–66 (4th ed. 2006). Those who do not share this view might try
to change outcomes by instructing the jury as to the utility functions to use—such as do not
take into account the possibly deadly consequences of your decisions. The Supreme Court,
in In re Winship, held that due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal
trials. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). This appears doubtful to us if it means a unitary standard no
matter what the case is about. The more plausible due process argument is to the effect that
the standard of proof in all trials must reflect, as the Court likewise noticed in In re Winship,
the respective costs of the mistakes that can be made. Since it is plausible to believe that
falsely acquitting a serial felon is more costly than falsely acquitting a first-time offender, it
follows that a less exacting standard of proof is plausible in the former case, depending upon
the relationship between the changed costs of a false acquittal and a false conviction.
68

2011]

IMPACT OF PRIOR CRIMES EVIDENCE

515

convict than when they are told nothing about priors. 69 The current
hypothesis would explain this otherwise improbable result. If we suppose
that jurors, given no priors at all, nonetheless infer them and accordingly
are more willing to convict, we can see why they might convict less often
upon learning that the priors are all quite different since their initial
inferential extrapolation might well have been to the effect that “defendant
has probably committed this sort of crime before.” Learning that
hypothesis to be unwarranted, jurors may well be more disposed to acquit
than they were before.
The key step in both hypotheses comes with the recognition that the
current structure of a criminal trial—its explicit rules as well as its built-in
incentives—creates a situation in which jurors can and arguably do
distinguish fairly reliably between defendants with priors and those without.
Having separated the sheep from the goats, it is foreseeable that they then
either reward the one, penalize the other, or both.
For purposes of this Article, it does not matter very much which
hypothesis is right or whether it is a mixture of the two. What is common
to both is a recognition that the structure of a trial enables modestly savvy
jurors to fairly reliably identify the serial offenders. Given that various
rules of evidence—especially Rules 403 and 404—were written precisely to
protect defendants from jurors making negative character or propensity
inferences from prior convictions, such data as we have surveyed make it
clear that jurors may routinely make such inferences, despite rules that
ostensibly exclude both negative character evidence and unfairly prejudicial
evidence. Whether we opt for the clean-record, guilt-deflation theory or the
serial-offender, guilt-inflation explanation—or some combination of the
two—(1) it is possible that jurors do figure out how to distinguish serial
felons from non-serial ones and (2) it is clear that they are coming down
significantly harder on the former than on the latter. This is not obviously a
bad thing. But good or bad, its occurrence makes nonsense of the elaborate
rules that have been put in place to prevent, or at least discourage, the
drawing of such a distinction in the context of making a judgment about
guilt or innocence. Refusing to admit prior crimes evidence for fear that
jurors will over-interpret its significance or derive some propensity
inferences from it is, in the current system, self-defeating. Judges may, and
often do, exclude evidence of priors in wholesale fashion pursuant to Rules
403 and 404. Still, that will not block jurors from often figuring out who
does and who does not have priors nor will it stop them from using that
conclusion to shape their verdict.

69

Lloyd-Bostock, supra note 28, at 746–47.
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One key empirical conjecture entailed by our analysis is that if a
defendant without prior convictions elects not to testify, then jurors—
receiving no signal that he has a clean record—are apt to infer mistakenly
that he has priors and will thus be more disposed to convict him. The
NCSC data strikingly support this conjecture. As the following table
shows, among prior-free defendants, the conviction rate for those who are
silent is a whopping 71% higher than the conviction rate for those who do
testify. Clearly, the conviction rate for non-testifying, prior-free defendants
is virtually indistinguishable from that of defendants with prior convictions.
If, as we propose below, prior convictions were presented as a matter of
routine, the prior-free defendants who elected silence would no longer be
subject to this stiff penalty. 70

Table 6
Conviction Rates for Prior-Free Defendants Who:

NCSC71

Testify

41%

Do not testify

70%

71

70

Given the analysis in this paper, the mystery is why a defendant with no prior
convictions—and his counsel—would deliberately forego the opportunity to make that fact
known to jurors. One explanation offered by one of our helpful critics during the
presentation of this paper at the Northwestern workshop, goes like this: “Assuming no
perjury, there is often very little a guilty defendant could say on the witness stand that will
help him. A positive correlation between testifying and acquittals among prior-free
defendants reflects that the guilty testify less frequently and thus does not imply causation.”
The problem is that in the real world, the assumption should be that a defendant is quite
willing to commit perjury. After all, most who testify, with and without priors, are found
guilty; and if they are not committing perjury, there is an amazing error rate at trial. Second,
a guilty defendant for whom the Government has made a plausible case of guilt really has no
choice but to take the stand and commit perjury; therefore the prediction should be that they
would readily. By taking the stand, not only do they get to lie, but they increase the
probability of demonstrating to the jury their clean record, which looks like it has probative
value to fact-finders. Another difficulty with this explanation is that it is entirely unclear
why it would only apply to prior-free defendants. It should also apply to those with priors,
and the results there are quite different.
71
These results emerge from our own analysis of the five data sets that constitute the
NCSC data. (Our thanks to Jorge Luis Silva for invaluable help integrating the sets.) See
HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 30.
The data also provide empirical support for the relative plausibility theory of juridical
proof. The empirical hypothesis concerning proof beyond reasonable doubt of the relative
plausibility theory is that guilt is determined by whether there is a plausible story of guilt and
a plausible story of innocence. If there is a plausible story of guilt and no plausible story of
innocence, convictions will ensue. It seems likely that cases where defendants do not testify
involve cases of essentially no presentation of a defense, thus leaving the prosecution’s case
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C. ROUND UP AND CONVICT THE USUAL—AND USUALLY GUILTY—
72
SUSPECTS.

There is a third hypothesis that must be explored, however. Although
it is quite different from the juror inferential hypotheses, it has similar
although not identical implications. It may also operate in conjunction with
the prior hypotheses we have considered, thus being a partial explanation.
Perhaps higher conviction rates for serial offenders can be explained by the
fact that police and prosecutors are keener on locking up serial felons. They
thus invest more effort in securing evidence and produce more solid cases.
Jurors may not just infer the existence of priors but also judge the case on
its own merits regardless of second-guessing about defendants’ priors. The
data we have been reporting thus may show a correlation between priors
and convictions, but not a strong causal relationship. Rather, the prior
record is a good predictor of a strong evidentiary case at trial.
Latent in this hypothesis are enormously complicated empirical
questions in addition to those concerning police and prosecutorial
motivations. For example, one implication of this hypothesis might be that
the state (to combine police and prosecutors into one term) applies a
differential standard in determining what cases to bring to trial, and that the
case against defendants without a record is often less strong than against
serial felons. However, one might think that, if the state is especially keen
on locking away serial offenders, it would bring to trial any serial offender
for which there was a reasonable chance of convicting. With defendants
lacking priors, by contrast, the state might give them a pass unless the case
was especially strong.
But the strength of a case may look quite different to the state than it
does to a jury; there may very well be substantial differences in the
surrounding circumstances that the state ignores in looking at the
probability of conviction that juries do not. For a whole host of reasons,
those without prior records may appear less threatening, less anti-social,

largely unrebutted. As most cases would not go to trial without a plausible story of guilt, in
most of the cases with no defense offered there should be convictions, as the data show. On
the relative plausibility theory, see Allen, supra note 4, at 609. Another potentially
confounding variable is that defendants without priors have more to lose with a conviction
than those with priors. Standing alone, this suggests that the chance of conviction should be
higher than for those with priors, as those without priors may take riskier cases to trial rather
than plea. That is not what the data show, however. Perhaps this is because those without
priors, having more to lose, may also invest more in the effort to avoid conviction. This
point seems to cut in both directions, thus suggesting the better explanation is the one we
give in the text.
72
With apologies to Casablanca.
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and so on. Those factors in turn may be associated with other variables—
such as race, class, or wealth—that the state may not wish to emphasize in
its investigative and charging decisions. The state may pay less attention to
such matters and more to the more discrete evidence of the particular act
than a jury might.
Similarly, cases are dynamic and not static. A prior record may be
positively correlated with the ease with which a case may be built in the
immediate preparation for trial. Those variables that perhaps were
downplayed at the point of the investigating and charging decisions may
very well be good predictors of how rich an evidentiary base can be
constructed. The result could easily be that the set of defendants without
priors looks, and in fact is, significantly different from that of serial felons.
If this hypothesis is true, then jurors again are simply reacting to the
strength of the case, and would not regard prior crimes that they are
informed about as particularly relevant as compared to the rest of the
evidentiary base—and thus neither is their absence missed. Moreover, as
with the previous hypotheses we have explored, fighting to keep priors out
of trial is still silly. Priors could be admitted and it wouldn’t significantly
change conviction rates. Hence this hypothesis, too, speaks to the selfdefeating character of Rule 404 and the use of Rule 403 to exclude prior
convictions.
Obviously this behavioral hypothesis is compatible with the
hypotheses about the jury inferential process. All could be true and partial
explanations for what we observe regarding jury behavior. Moreover, this
speculation, while quite compatible with the evidence concerning
defendants with priors, does not as obviously explain the differential
conviction rate of defendants without priors who do or do not take the
stand. Another factor might. Given the dramatic impact of not taking the
stand, perhaps it is those without priors who would be hurt by taking the
stand who tend not to testify, and they in turn will tend to be those who
cannot provide a plausible story of innocence. In any event, as we have
noted above, the implications for evidence law are the same regardless of
which of these or what combination of them actually explains the data. 73

73

Donald Dripps, in comments on a previous draft of this Article, pointed out that
another possible confounding variable is the ethical dilemma of defense counsel if they urge
clients to tell them the truth, are told a story of guilt, but the client still wants to testify.
Theoretically, a lawyer cannot sponsor perjured testimony. This may be operating to some
extent, but its scope is somewhat questionable given the rate at which those both with and
without priors who testify are convicted.
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IV. THE RELEVANCE QUESTION
Our suggestion to this point has been that a part, perhaps the major
part, of the explanation of why jurors so frequently convict defendants with
priors ostensibly unknown to them is that (a) they are generally able to infer
who has priors and (b) they regard such presumed priors as relevant
evidence of guilt, (c) as a license for lowering the bar for proof of guilt, or
(d) as an accurate predictor of strong evidentiary cases at trial. We mildly
incline to a combination of (a), (c), and (d) as the explanation for what is
going on. But we think it important to address (b) as well, not least because
the legal system frequently acts as if prior crimes have only marginal
relevance to current guilt. In this section, we explore whether (b) is, as the
law would have it, a confusion about relevance or probative value, or
whether jurors might well be right in holding that evidence of prior crimes
increases the probability of guilt in the case at hand.
There are at least two main arguments to consider, discussed below.
A. THE GOOD CHARACTER/BAD CHARACTER CONTRAST.

The law expressly allows a defendant to introduce evidence of his
good character. 74 This can include information that he has no prior
convictions, testimony from character witnesses, and testimony from the
defendant himself as to his sterling character. Indeed, the common law
traditionally insisted that proof of good character created a presumption that
defendant was not guilty of the crime. 75 Even now, it is common to find
jury instructions indicating that evidence of good character may be
sufficient by itself to justify an acquittal.76 In short, evidence of good
character is not only considered relevant by the courts but sufficiently
relevant standing alone to justify an acquittal. That is one reason why Rule

74

FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
Cf. Josephine Ross, “He Looks Guilty”: Reforming Good Character Evidence to
Undercut the Presumption of Guilt, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 231 (2004).
76
For instance, here is the jury instruction for the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma, promulgated in 2006:
75

The defendant has offered evidence of his reputation for good character or testimony in the form
of opinion as to his good character . . . . Evidence of good character may be sufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt whether the defendant is guilty, because you may think it improbable that a
person of good character would commit such a crime. Evidence of a defendant’s character,
inconsistent with those traits of character ordinarily involved in the commission of the crime
charged, may give rise to a reasonable doubt.

Jury Instruction, United States v. Good, 2006 Jury Instr. Lexis 1938 (W.D. Okla. 2006) (No.
CR-06-0070-F).
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404(a) admits “evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an
accused.” 77
Let us be clear about the logic of the situation: in acknowledging that
good character evidence is (exculpatorily) relevant, the courts are
committed to saying that:
prob (guilt/good character) < prob (guilt/bad character).

This inequality inescapably entails the (inculpatory) relevance of evidence
of bad character.
That notwithstanding, we have Rule 404(a) insisting that “[e]vidence
of a person’s [bad] character or trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion,”
and 404(b) holding that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith.” 78 In short, evidence of good character, including the
absence of prior convictions, is freely admitted as pertinent while evidence
of defendant’s bad character is excluded, except to refute evidence of good
character. There is no room here for the sort of Rule 403 balancing act that
weighs unfair prejudice against probative value. Prior crimes evidence
proffered to show the shady character 79 or criminal propensity of the
defendant is supposedly excluded from the prosecution’s case-in-chief. 80
Whatever the justification for this blanket exclusion, it cannot be that such
evidence lacks relevance.
Nor is the law consistent in holding that evidence of bad character is
generally irrelevant. Consider, for instance, that Rule 404(a) permits the
defendant to present prior convictions evidence against a prosecution
witness showing that the latter has a propensity for violent conduct. The
defendant in a homicide case, alleging self-defense or provocation, can
present evidence of prior convictions of the victim, aimed at showing that
the defendant was not the first aggressor. Such policies make sense only if
propensity evidence is relevant as a predictor of other bad acts. In
numerous other parts of the justice system, the relevance of prior crimes is
77

Another is concern that excluding such evidence by defendants would violate their
right to present a defense.
78
FED. R. EVID. 404.
79
Except for his character for lack of truthfulness. FED. R. EVID. 609.
80
This raises another possible explanation for the data we have been exploring: that the
promise of excluding propensity evidence highly associated with prior crimes is not
redeemed because of rules such as Rule 404(b). See supra note 56. We do not explore this
in the text for two reasons. First, the studies we have do not control for the subversion of
Rule 404(a) by the other rules. Second, if the other rules essentially let evidence in
equivalent to prior crimes, again it is obviously silly to be worried about excluding that very
evidence that other rules admit.
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both unchallenged and uncontroversial. For example, in bail hearings, in
trials for the civil commitment of the insane, or in sentencing hearings, it is
granted that a defendant’s prior seriality, when it exists, is a powerful
predictor of his future criminal behavior.81 Denying the relevance of priors
in showing the criminal propensity of the defendant in particular is highly
implausible, and probably perceived as such by the general public, not least
by those who serve as jurors.
We should not let it go wholly unnoticed that current evidence law—
specifically, Rules 413 and 414—routinely admits, in trials for rape and
sexual abuse, prior similar acts whether they led to convictions or not,
despite the fact that recidivism rates for this class of crimes are no higher
than for many others, where priors are by default excluded. 82 Since we
have to suppose that sexual priors are admitted because they are relevant, it
would be an obvious fallacy to suppose that similar priors lacked relevance
in the adjudication of other crimes.
B. THE EMPIRICAL CASE FOR RELIABILITY OF INFERENCES FROM
PRIOR CRIMES.

The data reprised in this paper plausibly suggest that jurors generally
figure out which defendants have prior convictions and are more likely to
convict those with priors than those without. We also can be fairly
confident, from the numerous exoneration projects that have been in place
over the last couple of decades, that the vast majority of those currently
convicted at trial are truly guilty. 83 These facts do not themselves establish
the relevance of priors, for it is conceivable that even if jurors convicted
defendants without records with the same frequency with which they
convict serial offenders, the vast majority of convictions would likewise be
convictions of the truly guilty. But what they do speak to—which is vastly
81

See generally Laudan & Allen, supra note 64.
According to Bureau of Justice Statistics figures, of the 3,265 convicted rapists
released from prison in 1994, some 46% were re-arrested for a felony within three years.
PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 9 tbl.10 (2002). However, only 2.5% of them were arrested
within three years for a sexual assault. Id. By contrast, 13% of those who served time for
robbery were re-arrested for robbery; 22% of assaulters were re-arrested for assault; and
23% of burglars were re-arrested for burglary. Id. Perhaps some defender of current
practices can explain why an assaulter’s similar priors are routinely excluded from trial and a
rapist’s are routinely admitted, despite the fact that the latter’s priors are both less relevant
and more prejudicial than the former’s (for instance, in the NCSC study, jurors learned of an
accused rapist’s prior convictions 71.4% of the time while, in cases of aggravated assault,
they learned of priors 27% of the time). See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 8, at 1374 tbl.5.
83
See generally Laudan & Allen, supra note 64. Of the dozen or so studies of
exoneration familiar in the literature, there are none that suggest a false-positive rate of more
than 5% and many make it much smaller than that.
82

522

LARRY LAUDAN & RONALD J. ALLEN

[Vol. 101

more important than relevance—is the trustworthiness of giving significant
probative weight to prior convictions. If jurors did what the courts wanted
them to do—that is, to give little or no probatory significance to presumed
priors—and if they do puzzle out who does and does not have a record in
making their choices, then the false acquittal rate could increase
substantially. Conceivably, a fair number of true convictions (and a tiny
proportion of false convictions) could be lost to the system. If, as appellate
courts are constantly claiming, the aim of a trial is to get at the truth, then a
system in which jurors factor prior convictions—either known or
presumed—into their calculations of guilt and innocence is probably more
truth-conducive than a system in which priors were ignored or treated as
irrelevant.
V. THE CASE FOR CHANGING HOW PRIOR CRIMES EVIDENCE IS HANDLED
Current law allows a judge to exclude prior crimes if their introduction
speaks to character or propensity (Rule 404) or if she determines that they
are much more prejudicial than probatory (Rule 403), and Rule 609 puts
other constraints on the admissibility of prior crimes even for purposes of
credibility. This policy is motivated by a commendable desire to block
jurors from convicting a defendant simply because he has committed prior
bad acts. 84 But if jurors can readily infer that a defendant is a serial felon
even when no priors are admitted, and we are persuaded that they can, then
what control has the legal system over the prejudicial character of the prior
bad-acts scenarios that will play out in the minds of jurors who have already
inferred the existence of prior crimes but have nothing save their
imagination to constrain their guesses about their frequency or depravity?
What does that imply about existing policies mandating the exclusion of
prior crimes evidence?
The answer to that question seems to be unambiguous: prior crimes
evidence should be admitted. Only in that way can jurors arrive at an
informed assessment of the bearing, frequency, and magnitude of the prior
crimes that they have reasonably inferred the defendant to have committed.
The balancing act mandated by Rule 403 makes sense, if at all, only if the
exclusion of evidence of prior crimes would block jurors from overinterpreting the probatory weight of the priors. But such an exclusion can
do nothing whatever to block jurors from prejudicially over-interpreting the
relevance of the priors that they suppose the defendant to have. On the
contrary, Rule 403 exclusions give free rein to the imagination of jurors
who have already rationally surmised that the defendant has prior
convictions.
84

ALLEN, ET AL., supra note 56, at 233.
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The current system does not prevent jurors from figuring out most of
the time which defendants have prior convictions and which do not. While
such inferences may have no constitutional mandate, judges are powerless
to prevent them. As dissenting Justices Stewart and White pointed out in
Griffin v. California: “No constitution can prevent the operation of the
human mind.” 85 Most of the time, it simply prevents jurors from having the
slightest idea specifically what those priors were. It is as if the judge were
routinely to announce, after the defense rests its case: “We now inform you
that the defendant has engaged in one or more bad acts and has been
convicted of them. But we won’t tell you either what they were, nor how
often they occurred, because that might unfairly prejudice you against the
defendant.”
Clearly, lesser fixes than abandoning the exclusion of priors offer little
or no remedy for the plethora of problems we have identified. It is already
widely agreed that limiting instructions to juries not to draw propensity
inferences from information given them by the prosecutor about prior
crimes are failures.86 An instruction urging jurors to give no significance to
their own inferences about the seriality of the defendant would be an even
more desperate instance of whistling in the wind. We have to face this
question: given that jurors can already usually figure out whether a
defendant has prior crimes or not, which course is preferable: informing
them precisely about which and how many priors the defendant has, or
leaving them to draw their own unfettered conclusions about how egregious
or mild the serial defendant’s priors happen to be? The former policy
disadvantages the defendant whose priors are relatively mild or unlike the
crime with which he is currently charged. At the other extreme, it shields
the defendant with a lengthy rap sheet from jurors grasping the true measure
of his seriality. How many serial felons are falsely convicted because
jurors—uninformed about the nature of the priors but quite sure of their
existence—make them out to be much worse than they actually are? And
how many are falsely acquitted when the actual seriality of their criminal
record is underestimated by juries who are confident about nothing more
than that defendant has a record but do not know what it is? Obviously,
nothing guarantees that jurors will give the “correct probative weight” to
the priors that they learn about. Still, knowing specifically what the priors
are is preferable to the current situation in which jurors conjecture, not only
about their relevance, but likewise about their frequency and character.
Given, too, that we have several studies that strongly suggest that mock

85

380 U.S. 609, 623 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
For an empirical study of the matter, see VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING
THE JURY 124–27 (1986).
86
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jurors attach much less weight to dissimilar priors than to similar ones, and
less to remote priors rather than to recent ones, it seems that concerns of
damage control alone would argue for making the priors known.
There is another issue worthy of attention: under current rules, when
priors do not overtly appear, a defendant’s attorney is in no position to
argue before jurors about their salience. If priors were routinely admitted,
defense attorneys could attempt to argue their minimal relevance, with
prosecutors arguing the other side. This would surely be a good debate for
the jury to hear, prior to resolving the question for themselves. But, under
current practices, it occurs explicitly only when priors pass the tests of
Rules 403, 404, and 609. And in the latter case, the arid debate in court is
usually limited to the bearing of the priors on the question of whether the
defendant’s testimony is truthful. By contrast, under current rules, jurors
are free to assign to them whatever probative value they fancy. They can
suppose them to be many or few; that the crimes in question were minor
misdemeanors or grievous felonies; that they were similar to the charged
crime or vastly different; and that they were of recent or remote vintage.
Which system would be fairer to the defendant and more likely to produce
true verdicts: one in which jurors’ imaginations were free to conjure up
whatever set of priors took their fancy, or a system in which the specific
priors were cited and the only question left to jurors’ imagination was the
degree of their bearing on the decision they are called on to make?
It also seems highly likely that, if prior crimes evidence were routinely
admitted, more defendants would testify and more evidence of good
character would emerge. 87 Substantial amounts of time and other valuable
resources currently invested in debates about the admissibility of prior
crimes evidence would be freed up for other purposes. 88 Indeed, Professor
Imwinkelreid, an expert on such matters, tells us that “Rule 404(b) is the
most litigated provision in the Federal Rules of Evidence,” adding that “[i]t
generates more published opinions than any other provision of the Rules.”89

87

Arguably, admitting prior convictions as a matter of course would also have the
desirable effect of undermining the principal rationale for the Griffin rule, Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), thereby re-enabling jurors to draw adverse inferences from
defendant’s silence, which would remove one further obstacle to the defendant participating
in the trial itself.
88
Plea bargaining would be facilitated by eliminating an important ambiguity concerning
the admissibility of what some will continue to think is important evidence; for the same
reason, more defendants may decline jury trials, again lowering costs. Of course, some may
not think these are advantages, but we do.
89
Edward J. Imwinkelreid, An Evidentiary Paradox: Defending the Character Evidence
Prohibition by Upholding a Non-Character Theory of Logical Relevance, the Doctrine of
Chances, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 419, 433 (2006).
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Most such litigation would vanish if prior crimes evidence were routinely
admitted. 90
What if our behavioral hypothesis about the state partially explains the
data? This would complicate matters to be sure, but not the final
conclusion that the misshapen stone should be removed. The argument for
maintaining the present rule is that the more liberal admission of prior
records would change the incentive structure of the state.91 This is
implausible as a significant factor with respect to the police investigations
that are motivated by more immediate concerns. It may change the balance
somewhat for prosecutors but there is not much room to change if in fact a
prior record already predicts a strong evidentiary case. A few different
cases may be taken to trial than would otherwise be the case, but many of
them are likely to be cases of guilt just because of the predictive effects of
prior records on the hypothesis we are examining. Against the low
probability of cases of innocence being brought would have to be weighed
all the effects discussed regarding the inferential hypotheses we have
examined, and of course the enormous cost of litigation surrounding the
misshapen stone of exclusion. Although to some extent it is an empirical
question in need of more data, so far as we can tell now, the balance already
seems clear. 92

90

As we are about to discuss in the text, one needs to worry about unintended
consequences. For all the reasons we have discussed, it does not seem likely to us that
changing admission rules would have a dramatic effect on the mix of litigated cases, but we
wish to acknowledge the possibility.
91
We are aware that the point we make in the text generalizes and that any change in the
rules may change the incentive structure in myriad unpredictable ways some of which may
be irrational—perhaps defense lawyers will not believe the data presented here, for example,
and thus perhaps will feel the need to engage in more compromises during plea bargaining if
prior records are more readily admitted. One can make one’s own judgments about the
significance of such concerns.
92
The manner in which information about prior convictions would be related to juries,
the amount of detail about them, and so on, would need to be worked out. There would be
much to argue about here, but these hardly present insurmountable problems. Judges are
aware of prior records at bench trials, and no one seems to object to that. The data we have
presented here suggest that there is no good reason to fear how juries handle this type of
data, thus suggesting that the details of admission should be reasonably resolvable. A more
difficult issue would be what instructions should be given about the use of the evidence. We
would favor an instruction to the effect that the jury may consider the evidence on whatever
issues to which the jurors think it is pertinent, but with a strong admonition about, first, its
inferential limits, and second, that the issue is not whether the defendant is a serial offender
but instead whether he committed the act of which he is accused.
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There is at least one other variable to worry about.93 Eliminating the
current rule, so the argument might go, may lead to more perjured
testimony, because the risk of being impeached by priors only if one
testifies has been removed (priors are coming in anyway). The increased
perjured testimony may lead in turn to an increase in false acquittals.
Essentially, we would need to know whether the current regime or one in
which priors are readily admitted and more guilty defendants take the stand
and lie would produce better outcomes. We think this is an interesting
speculation, although note how far it is from the current justifications for
the rule. Although again this shows how further empirical work needs to be
done, a few points are obvious. Even if changing the rule changed behavior
resulting in more false acquittals, as we have shown it may also result in
more true acquittals and more true convictions, and thus this increased cost
would still need to be weighed against the increased benefits. Second, the
data we have to date indicate that the ready admission of priors may
actually increase the rate of guilty verdicts rather than decrease it.
Remember, those with priors who testify are convicted at a higher rate than
those with priors who do not. One possible explanation for this is precisely
that the guilty who lie can often be shown to be liars. Many may still take
that chance because they have no viable alternatives, and they may be
encouraged to if not testifying no longer shields their criminal record.
Nonetheless, if cross-examination and the presentation of contradicting
evidence have such effects, as the data suggest they do, admitting priors
routinely may lead to increased rates of conviction and increased accuracy
of verdicts generally, rather than promote false acquittals alone.
VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the Justices on the Supreme Court realize all this and find it
impossible to block jurors from inferring unmentioned priors, but still think
that officially excluding priors is preferable to admitting them since the
former policy keeps the judges’ hands clean. This, after all, was precisely
the position the Justices took in the famous Griffin case, dealing with a
defendant’s silence: “What the jury may infer, given no help from the court,
is one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the
accused into evidence against him is quite another.”94

93
94

We are indebted to Michael Pardo for encouraging us to think about this.
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
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This holier-than-thou, see-no-evil attitude, if it exists, would be a
puerile reaction to a serious situation. Far more candid is the conclusion
reached in 2001 by England’s Lord Justice Auld in his well-known Review
of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales. He wrote:
[T]he reality of the present law [concerning the admissibility of previous crimes] is
that it mostly does not conceal from the tribunal of fact that a defendant has some—
though not precisely what—criminal record. In the resultant scope for speculation, it
is thus capable of engendering as much or more prejudice against him [as the
admission of priors would]. And it is not an honest system in that it does not do what
95
it is claimed to do.

Although he was appraising the system in England and Wales, the
general features of his diagnosis apply to U.S. practices. The principal
difference between then and a decade later is that we now have solid
empirical evidence—instead of intuitions—that the current system is both
intellectually dishonest and that it does little or nothing to aid those
defendants whom it was specifically invented to protect. The only
defendants who obviously profit from the current system are those with rap
sheets even longer and more grisly than jurors imagine them to be, and
perhaps lawyers in need of business.
We realize, of course, that data always underdetermine theory and
perhaps other explanations for the data can be offered; we have tried to
respond to some alternatives by showing their lack of plausibility. In
addition, our explanation generates various testable empirical hypotheses
that would tend to confirm it. For example, we predict that jurors start with
an assumption that defendants have prior records and that the assumption
affects their deliberations virtually no matter what judges may tell them.
We also predict that the biggest discrepancy between judges’ and jurors’
views of the evidence will be located in the set of cases in which jurors are
not directly informed of defendant’s priors, and thus must engage in
surmise. We also predict that a fair amount of surmising is going on as a
result of the other mechanisms we have mentioned for indirectly indicating
the nature of a defendant’s priors. Last, we predict that one product of that
surmising is likely to be to disadvantage the innocent defendant. Whether
any good test of that proposition can be structured is problematic, because
of the lack of a good measure of factual guilt independent of the trial itself.
That is the central difficulty of empirical studies of criminal trials.
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